Late August. British commanders plan their attack...
Some thought was given by British naval commander Rear Adm. George Cockburn to sailing directly up to Baltimore Harbor, and leveling Ft. McHenry. If Fort McHenry could be reduced, the British could then sail their shallower draft vessels and bomb ketches right into the harbor.
From this vantage point, the Hampstead Hill earthwork defenses and artillery
emplacements could be mercilessly bombarded from the flank. If this bombardment were
coordinated with simultaneous infantry attacks, this could roll up a weakened
American defensive line. After that, the city would be wide open to plundering and destruction
by British troops, unless a crushing tribute was paid instead.
In Washington, the British burned government buildings for strategic political reasons. The fate of Baltimore would no doubt be far worse. For several reasons British commanders decided this plan might prove too costly. And such a plan also had to consider that the American troops positioned behind defensive works at Hampstead Hill (also known then as Loudenslager Hill) would still have to be assaulted afterward.
Instead of a all-out naval attack to reduce or even run past Fort McHenry, it was decided that a bombardment would be made on the fort as a diversion. This would hopefully draw troops away from the defensive lines atop Hampstead Hill. This thinning of the militia lines would render the fortifications less daunting for the British land forces, once they arrived there.
In the end, British
commanders decided that the land attack would go by the eastern
approach, up Patapsco Neck and on to Loudenschlager (now 'Hampstead') Hill.
This approach also afforded some protection to the army's flank by the naval guns. Small craft could also maintain lines of supply and communication with the land forces advancing up the eastern approach to the city.